Acting upon uncertain beliefs

Miloud Belkoniene , Patryk Dziurosz-Serafinowicz


This paper discusses the conditions under which an agent is rationally permitted to leave some uncertain propositions relevant to her decision out of her deliberation. By relying on the view that belief involves a defeasible disposition to treat a proposition as true in one’s reasoning, we examine the conditions under which such a disposition can be overridden and under which an agent should take into account her uncertainty as to a proposition she believes in the course of a particular deliberation. We argue that, in some contexts, an agent can be faced with the choice of either accepting or not accepting a proposition she believes in the course of her deliberation. We provide a description of such higher-order deliberations within the framework of expected utility theory and draw conclusions regarding the phenomenon of pragmatic encroachment on knowledge.
Publication typeIn press (online first, early view)
Author Miloud Belkoniene
Miloud Belkoniene,,
, Patryk Dziurosz-Serafinowicz (FSS / IPSJ / DLPSE)
Patryk Dziurosz-Serafinowicz,,
- Division of Logic, Philosophy of Science and Epistemology
Journal seriesActa Analytica, [Acta Analytica], ISSN 0353-5150, e-ISSN 1874-6349, (N/A 100 pkt)
Issue year2019
Noonline first
Publication size in sheets0.9
Keywords in Englishdecision-theory, higher-order decision, belief, acceptance, pragmatic encroachment on knowledge
ASJC Classification1211 Philosophy
Languageen angielski
LicenseOther; published final; Uznanie Autorstwa (CC-BY); with publication
Score (nominal)100
Score sourcejournalList
ScoreMinisterial score = 100.0, 07-02-2020, ArticleFromJournal
Publication indicators Scopus SNIP (Source Normalised Impact per Paper): 2018 = 0.568
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